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Since the early twentieth century Nicaragua, together
with much of Latin America, has been the focus of the
political influence of the United States. However, during
the Cold War the Soviet Union, a new political power of the
world, demonstrated its influential politics in Latin
America. The Soviet Union was concentrating political power
in Latin American countries to spread Marxist ideals. This
was to combat the influence of the United States and its
imperialist goals in the region. Nicaragua was a country
that was on the verge of revolution. The Soviet Union knew
that if Nicaragua was politically weak from a revolution it
could use the idea of communism to influence the state. The
Soviet Union believed that through Cuba it could support
the revolution of the Sandinista Party. Cuba was known for
its communist beliefs, which the Soviet Union wanted to
spread to Nicaragua.
What influences impacted the Sandinista Revolution?
Was the Sandinista Revolution the manifestation of a puppet
war taking place among multiple forces outside and inside
of the country itself? Did the United States use its
relations with Anastasio Somoza Debayle to attempt to
cripple Fidel Castro's communist Cuba? Also was the Russiafriendly government in Cuba using the Sandinista Party, and
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its struggles, to gain a stronger foothold in the area?
This paper will show that the Sandinista Party incorporated
the Sandino name to gain more support for its cause.
There are many questions as to the causes of the
Nicaraguan Revolution, yet none are as important as that of
the role the United States played in the conflict,
specifically, its involvement in the politics and economic
matters of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan government. The
United States' involvement allowed for the survival of
particular parties in Nicaragua. In this paper the
discussion of the causes leading up to the Nicaraguan
Revolution will indicate that the United States decided the
fate of the country and those who fought for it.
The collapse of the Central American Federation, in
1838 1, was the starting point for outside control of
Nicaragua. This collapse left Nicaragua vulnerable because
it no longer had the support of neighboring countries.
Since Nicaragua was vulnerable the country suffered from
internal strife as well as fear of an outside takeover. The
main struggle within Nicaragua was a battle between
conservatives and liberals to maintain political power.
With the coming of the twentieth century the liberal party
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of Nicaragua came into power and installed Jose Santos
Zelaya as the country's president. Zelaya was a progressive
president who felt that the modernization of Nicaragua must
be accomplished to ensure its success. Zelaya believed that
outside investment was the only way to get the process of
modernization started. 2 Although Zelaya knew the risk of an
outside takeover, he saw no other way to save the
Nicaraguan economy without the support of outside
investors. Therefore, Zelaya encouraged foreign investment
into Nicaragua. The United States quickly dominated a large
number of firms and companies within Nicaragua. This
control allowed the United States to monopolize much of the
resources in Nicaragua by the early twentieth century.
Zelaya, feeling the effects of his foreign investors,
began to fear a growing American imperial takeover, and
began to stake his country's claim on its own resources. 3
This reclaiming of control from the United States, by
President Zelaya, came to a boil when Zelaya blocked a
local canal proposed by the United States. At this point,
the United States found that it would need to remove the
existing liberal government and replace it with a
friendlier conservative government.
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In 1909, with American encouragement, a revolt of
conservatives broke out in Nicaragua. 4 The United States
Marines protected this conservative group in order to
further the revolt. With the fear of nothing less than full
scale war Zelaya was forced to resign and conservative
Adolfo Diaz replaced Zelaya him as president. Diaz, a
former employee of an American-run firm was given his
position by the Conservative Party. 5 The party chose Diaz
because of the strong support the United States showed
toward him.
President Diaz and his new government officials were
seen by many as a United States puppet regime and they were
very unpopular with the majority of the Nicaraguan people.
This lack of support led to several uprisings which were
resolved by the intervention of United States Marines. In
return for the protection of the conservative government,
concessions were made to the United States, the most
important of these concessions was the Treaty of BryanChamorro of 1916. 6 This treaty gave the United States sole
possession of the rights to build a canal through
Nicaragua. The goal of this treaty was not for the United
States to build the canal but to keep other countries from
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stepping in and building it. The United States did not want
other countries to build a canal through Nicaragua because
it felt that it would take away from some of its power and
control in Nicaragua. The reason that the United States did
not build the canal was because of the prior existence of
the Panama Canal.
The United States policy makers finally decided to
develop a new political strategy towards Nicaragua. So in
1927 conservatives and liberals signed an agreement to
provide Nicaragua with presidential elections. 7 These
elections protected an image; they made the Nicaraguan
people feel as if they were in control of their country's
politics. The elections would, of course, be held under
United States supervision. Even though the liberal party
won back its power with the 1927 elections, the real power
of Nicaragua was still in the hands of the Americans. 8 The
power remained with the United States because of its heavy
political, economic, and military influence in the state.
This did not sit well with many Nicaraguans,
especially one in particular. Augusto Cesar Sandino was a
liberal officer, born to a liberal landowner; his mother
was a servant of Indian descent. 9 Sandino worked for several
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companies in Mexico that were American owned following the
Mexican Revolution. In working for these American
companies, and seeing their imperialist control in Mexico,
Sandino decided that he would not sit idly by and watch his
country be taken over by an imposing American nation. In
addition to his experience through his employment, Sandino
was also influenced by the growing radical ideals from post
revolutionary Mexico. 10
After Sandino's time in Mexico, he returned to
Nicaragua to join in the rebellion against the puppet
government in place in Nicaragua. After being unable to
convince the other liberal officers to give him command of
the liberal army, Sandino decided to form his own army. 11
Sandino's army was composed mainly of poor workers and
farmers. After seven years of guerilla warfare with the
Marines, Sandino and his army finally forced the United
States out of Nicaragua.
Prior to Sandino's successful uprising, the United
States government created the Nicaraguan National Guard.
This guard was designed to maintain a political and
military foothold for the United States in Nicaragua. After
the withdrawal of the Marines, President Diaz ran against
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liberal candidate Juan Sacasa in the 1932 election for
president. 12 This election was won by Sacasa and was thought
to have a calming effect in Nicaragua. The United States,
at the same time, placed in power its pick for the leader
of the Nicaraguan National Guard, who was a man named
Anastacio Somoza Garcia.
Following the withdrawal of the United States Marines,
Sacasa demanded that Sandino disarm. However, Sandino
distrusted both Sacasa and Somoza and refused to give up
his army. The three men met twice to try to come to an
agreement for the disarmament of the Sandino-led army.
After the second meeting, a dinner at the Presidential
Palace, Somoza reportedly ordered his men to arrest Sandino
and the officers that had accompanied him. Rather than an
arrest Sandino, he and the other officers were shot. 13
Somoza denied responsibility for the murders. After Somoza
used his power as leader of the National Guard to overthrow
Sacasa he took full responsibility for the murders. 14 As
Somoza gained control of Nicaragua in 1934 he laid the
groundwork for the dynasty that he and his sons would rule
over until 1979.
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The United States did not fight the Somoza Dynasty,
mainly because its interests in Nicaragua were safe while
the Somozas were in power. As the Somoza family ruled,
Anastasio Somoza Garcia had his two sons training to take
over the country when he was gone. Somoza's youngest son
Anastasio Somoza Debayle graduated from West Point Academy,
one of the United States' most prestigious military
schools. Luis, the older son, was forced to take command of
the country after his father's assassination in 1956. 15 Due
to Somoza sending his son to West Point and maintaining
friendly relations with the United States, the United
States did not did not fear Somoza taking control of
Nicaragua.
Luis and Anastasio controlled power both directly and
indirectly through puppet presidents that they placed into
power. Throughout the Somoza rule both of the brothers kept
a friendly relationship with the United States, which
allowed both sides to continue making money. 16 The Somozas
were notorious for funneling large amounts of Nicaragua's
capital into their private accounts. This funneling
demonstrated the Somoza's complete lack of any presidential
leadership skills. The majority of the Nicaraguan citizens
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began to organize a rebellion against the dictatorship that
had overtaken their country. Nicaraguan citizens were in
need of non-United States dominated aid and political
assistance. They needed new ideas and philosophies, ideas
like those that the Soviet Union had shared with Cuba.
The Soviet Union came to Nicaragua with philosophies
and political ideas that would help to lead Nicaragua to a
revolution against the United States dominated regime.
Soviet influence in Latin America and the Western
Hemisphere started as early as 1920 gaining power and
momentum with each country that supported its ideals. Some
Latin American leaders believed in the ideas promoted by
the Russian Socialist Party, which specifically influenced
Nicaragua and its communist ideology. Through reading
Lenin’s "Utopian Socialist Society" many Latin American
citizens became further supporters of this Russian
philosophy. 17 As political leaders of the Soviet Union began
to hear rumors of Latin America supporting its ideologies
they worked to increase its level of involvement in this
region. The first parties to openly show their Soviet
connections were, the Socialist Worker's Parties in

17

Danuta Paszyn . The Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change in Central America, 1979-90. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 10

11
Argentina (1921) and Uruguay (1920). 18 As time went by more
and more socialist parties sprang up, and, as stated by
Danuta Paszyn, "by 1930 some form of Communist Party was
functioning in all of the Latin American countries." 19 This
infiltration of Soviet doctrine soon would lead to a full
scale revolution throughout the region.
With the coming of the 1930's the intensity of the
Soviet policy toward Latin American revolutions had taken a
huge step. Joseph Stalin urged many communists to take up
arms and fight for their own socialist ideals. Stalin
wanted to encourage, and support, those who were following
the socialist theory. Soon after, Farabundo Augustin Martí,
the leader of the Salvadoran Communist Party, started an
armed uprising in 1932 in El Salvador. In El Salvador there
was an extreme divide between the wealthy and the poor.
This set up the perfect conditions for a socialist doctrine
to thrive. Paszyn shows in the following the extremes that
lead to the uprising;
In El Salvador a small elite group of land owners, 30
to 40 families, controlled nearly all the arable soil,
which constituted 60 percent of all of the land, and
dominated all spheres of Salvadoran society. 20

18
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With the conditions of most Latin American countries
becoming closer and closer to that of El Salvador an
uprising in Nicaragua was sure to occur. However, little
could happen in Nicaragua until 27 years later when the
Cuban Revolution was achieved.
The Cuban Revolution overthrew the Batista regime in
1959. This was the first successful communist revolution
achieved in Latin America. It was this revolution that
allowed the Soviet Union to gain an important ally in its
efforts to its spread socialist ideals. Castro, the
president of Cuba, by this time had made Cuba a political
weapon for the Soviet Union. The two countries set their
eyes on Nicaragua as the next place for a revolution. There
were two main goals to be achieved in Nicaragua. The first
goal was for the Soviet Union to establish a base for
further economic and geopolitical expansion into the
region. The second goal was to create a successful
revolution in Nicaragua to open the door to further export
revolution into the Central American isthmus. 21 In order for
a revolution to be sparked in Nicaragua the Soviet Union
knew that a rebellious group would first need to be formed
and start a movement. The movement would need to lead

21
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uprisings against those currently in power, and show a
strong support for socialist ideology.
The Sandinista movement was exactly what the Soviet
Union wanted it started as a product of anti-Somoza
movements conducted by students in 1944-48. 22 The Sandinista
Party was also known as the Sandinista National Liberation
Front, FSLN. The primary member and founder of the FSLN was
Carlos Fonseca Amador, who during his time in high school,
in Matagalpa, was introduced to Marxism. He joined the
Nicaraguan Socialist party (PSN) in the 1950s, showing his
support for communism. After high school Carlos Fonseca
traveled to Managua to study at the National Autonomous
University. 23 Fonseca became a leading member of the student
government, and was also one of the editors of the school
paper. Fonseca wrote about socialist ideology and openly
showed his lack of support for the Somoza Regime. Because
of his blatant articles, Fonseca was targeted and arrested
after the assassination of President Somoza Garcia in 1956.
In addition to Fonseca's arrest, many other student
leftists were arrested. Fonseca was released after a month
in prison. Following his release, "The PSN sent Fonseca to
the Soviet Union in 1957, after which he wrote a pamphlet
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extolling socialism." 24 Upon returning to Nicaragua, Fonseca
continued his protests on behalf of those who were still
imprisoned, and was arrested on several accounts. Despite
these arrests Fonseca continued to fight against what he
believed to be a puppet regime, United States-controlled
government.
The Nicaraguan government deported Carlos Fonseca in
1958 by the Nicaraguan Government and sent him to
Guatemala. From Guatemala Fonseca eventually traveled to
Cuba were he became "entranced with Castro's revolution." 25
Fonseca felt that he could organize a revolution like that
of Cuba to oust the Somoza dynasty. The PSN, with its
conservative nature, rejected Fonseca's attempts at a
revolution. This led to Fonseca quitting the PSN. Fonseca
continued to support and carry out activist movements, but
he found them to be radical and most failed. In support of
Fonseca's efforts, John Booth writes, "Carlos Fonseca
Amador, however, pressed on; he organized a clandestine
revolutionary network and cultivated Cuban Support." In
1961, along with Tomas Borge and Silvo Mayorga, Fonseca
formed the FLSN, which would become the revolutionary power
in Nicaragua for the next eighteen years. This was one of
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Fonseca's greatest revolutionary successes, and it allowed
him to continue the fight against Somoza and a government
that had imprisoned him.
The FSLN gained power and the support of many
Nicaraguan citizens. However, Somoza was able to hold on to
the political support of the United States. The United
States kept on a course and did not waver in its support of
the Somoza family until the presidency of Jimmy Carter in
the late 1970s. The United States aid to the Somoza
brothers was, from the United States' point of view, a way
to promote pro-United States political stability in
Nicaragua. As John Booth states in his study of the
revolution,
The theory was that aid could promote non-Communism,
pro-Americanism, and stability, which were viewed as
conducive to American security in the context of the
Cold War. 26

The United States' support of the Somoza Dynasty was a
means to justify its part in training and supporting a
system of government that was far from democratic, but was
rather a dictatorship. The United States fear of communism
benefited the Somoza government.
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In the end Somoza tied his arms behind his back in
terms of keeping his family's hold on Nicaragua. In
addition to the problems brought by a Russia-backed Cuba,
there was internal strife caused by the Sandinista rebels.
The Sandinista Party began using Augusto Sandino's name as
a weapon against Somoza. This name represented a lack of
support for the United States companies in Nicaragua and
became a means for showing disgust for the puppet role that
the Somozas were playing. The party was further
strengthened by the ideas that Sandino had brought to
battle. The battle cry of Sandino not only went against
Somoza, but also Somoza's largest backer, the United States
of America. These two reminders of Sandino brought
difficulties to Somoza because they brought back a past
that Somoza preferred be forgotten.
It was clear to Somoza that the Sandinista Party was a
Communist Party. Somoza believed that the communists were
trying to grab hold of another country, like Cuba, and
secure a communist foothold in Central America. He stated
his displeasure for this in the following,
In 1971, Carlos Fonseca Amador sent a message to the
Communist Party Congress in Moscow. He wanted to be
certain that the Communist Party knew of his loyalty
and devotion. 27

27
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This quote shows that Somoza was aware of the Sandinista's
ties to communism. Somoza furthered this tie by stating
that the Sandinistas as were the “successor(s) to the
Bolshevik Revolution,” and that Fonseca was led only by
Lenin’s ideas. 28 Throughout Somoza’s book he painted the
FSLN as a puppet party (especially after Fonseca’s death),
that was manipulated by not only the Soviet Union but more
directly by Castro's Cuba.
By this point in history many of the Nicaraguan people
began to follow the propaganda of the FSLN. Due to the
negative economic and political conditions in Nicaragua the
citizens wanted a new leader and the FSLN was ready to lead
them to one. The farmers of the northern hills saw no aid
from the Somozan government and knew that their economic
situation would soon collapse completely. The farmers of
Nicaragua heard the stories of roads that Somoza had paved
to his beaches while, they traveled down homemade paths and
dreamed of a day when they would reap the same benefits as
their leader. In 1969, the FSLN released a statement that
called for the confiscation of capitalist and agricultural
holdings, it also called for the nationalization of all of
Somoza's properties; which in turn would cancel the Bryan-
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Chamorro Treaty of 1916. 29 This demonstrated the power of
the FSLN and increased the level of fear Somoza had in
regards to his control over Nicaragua.
In David Nolan’s, The Ideology of the Sandinistas and
the Nicaraguan Revolution 30 he examines primary documents of
the FSLN to better understand what the party wanted to
accomplish in its war against the Somoza government. He
states the following,
… that the FSLN has sought to bring about major change
in Nicaragua and that this goal has been in large part
ideologically motivated. 31

He showed this throughout his study of the FSLN and its
members.
Nolan's work focused primarily on Fonseca and his
ideological influences that led him to be the head of the
party. The main influence for Fonseca was his socialist
background. Fonseca felt that the use of Augusto Sandino
would give Fonseca, and the FLSN, a better base from which
to draw upon. Fonseca saw Sandino as a “true antiimperialist, whose ideology held the seeds of revolutionary
class consciousness.” 32 As Fonseca’s movement continued, he
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used of the communist banner and the image of Sandino. This
began to prove harder to fit into the growing ideology of
the FSLN because Sandino was not a communist. To dismiss
this conflict, Fonseca, and later his successor Humberto
Ortega, simply omitted the fact that Sandino was not a
communist. As Nolan wrote, “Ortega claimed Sandino as an
anti-bourgeois, a class revolutionary dedicated to the same
goal of social transformation as the FSLN.” 33 Fonseca
emphasized that this fact should be viewed as the focal
point of the organization.
Problems emerged by using Sandino in the FSLN
movement, the FLSN began in the 1970s to show signs of
fracture. The differences that the party began to show
spread into the fractioning of the party into three main
groups. The three groups that emerged from, yet still under
the FLSN banner, were the Proletarian Wing, the Prolonged
People's War Group (GPP), and the Terceristas or Third
Force Faction. 34 The first two groups were still Marxist in
their overall ideology. The difference in the groups was
their tactics for fighting the war and their use of
propaganda.
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The Proletarian Wing, however, was trying to increase
the overall mass of the revolution by organizing factory
unions. They wanted to use the new industrialization
classes to create these unions. Also the Proletarian Wing
was under fire from the other two groups for its use of
propaganda. As John Booth writes, "The other factions
criticized the Proletarios (Proletarian Wing) for excessive
'propagandism' for adherence to a 'traditional Marxist
line…'" 35 The GPP on the other hand took a more cautious
approach to the war and was criticized for, at times,
isolating itself from the people of the country.
The last group that came out of the split was that of
the Terceristas who, more than the other groups, took a
completely different line on the Marxist ideology of the
FLSN. This group included groups such as the Social
Democratic, and Social Christian Group. 36
With these gaps in the FLSN it was clear the FLSN
would crumble because of its own differences. This
surprisingly, did not happen, all of the groups of the FLSN
stayed united enough to continue on with the mission to
dethrone Somoza. Due to the ability of the FSLN to stay
intact, the revolution against Somoza was able to continue.
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The reason for the continued FLSN front against Somoza
was due to miscalculations by President Somoza Debayle in
many of his actions. Somoza's biggest error was the killing
of Pedro Joaguin Chammorro, who was a much loved journalist
of the La Prensa. 37 Chammorro's death sparked an extreme
backlash toward the Somoza Regime from the right. 38 Many of
the elite in Nicaragua, including Chammorro's parents, were
unaffected by Somoza's killing of poor, lower class,
Nicaraguans, but they were shocked by the action taken
against one of their own.
In addition to the anger sparked by Chammorro's
murder, was the anger caused the funneling of international
aid to the pocket of the Somoza Regime. The National Guard
and Somoza after the 1972 earthquake stole aid money that
was designed to help with the rebuilding and reimbursement
costs of the earthquake. This selfish act pushed more and
more conservatives and elite to oust the Somozan
government. As the rest of the country's classes and
political parties began to place pressure on Somoza, the
FLSN took time to reunite their different groups and push
Somoza out while his support was limited.
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The United States had supported the Somoza Dynasty for
much of the twentieth century in return for the involvement
it was playing in Nicaraguan politics and for the aid it
was receiving in the fight against communism. United States
aid to the Somoza Regime rose from $1 million annually in
1953 to $17.3 million annually in 1975. 39 This funding was
repaid in the eyes of the United States through Nicaragua's
willingness to aid the fight against communism in Cuba. As
Anastasio Somoza Debayle writes in his book, “My father, my
brother, Luis, and I took part directly, indirectly, and
openly to defeat Communism in Central America.” 40 This open
attack towards communism led the United States to ask the
Somoza Regime if they would be willing to help in efforts
to overthrow Castro and the Cuban government. This was the
path that led Nicaragua to support the 1961 Bay of Pigs
Invasion. This involvement in a United States run military
operation demonstrated Somoza's complete support of United
States policy on communism.
The election of Jimmy Carter in 1977 was a turning
point in the amount of aid the United States would give the
Somoza Dynasty. Carter, who had always been an advocate for
human rights, began to see Anastasio Somoza Debayle as a
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threat to his continuation for promoting his human rights
policies. Carter slowed the aid to Nicaragua because he
wanted to begin distancing the United States. Carter knew
that Somoza was losing his foothold with the FSLN, but
Carter could not cut the ties completely because of
economic constraints. The book Nicaragua: An Ally Under
Siege, edited by Belden Bell, documents a decline of United
States support under Carter. "The controversial assistance
package currently being funneled through A.I.D. amounts to
roughly $6.1 million… in 1978." 41 This amount was close to
eleven million less that United States had given the
Nicaragua in 1975.
The timing of Carter's policies seemed to be a way for
the United States to save face. The United States did not
want the Latin American policy makers to blame it for the
failing Somoza government. Moreover, the United States
diplomatically distanced itself from Somoza in a way that
it still had an anti-FLSN stance. This is seen through
Carter's praise of Somoza's progress on human rights in
President Somoza's visits to the United States in 1978. The
irony of this praise was the fact that Somoza was not
respecting human rights, yet in order to continue the anti-

41

Belden Bell., ed. Nicaragua: An Ally Under Siege. Washington D.C.: Council on American Affairs,
1978, 137.

24
communist ties with Somoza, Carter needed to show some
human rights progress countries diplomacy. However, since
open violations of human rights by Somoza and the National
Guard increased the United States was forced to back off
its full support for Somoza. This decline in support would
be the undoing of the Somoza Dynasty as it was overthrown
by the FSLN, with the United States standing idly by and
watching.
The role that the United States played in fostering
the revolution was clearly crucial in this series of pawn
wars. Because of the United States long history in the
region, such as the Monroe Doctrine and later the Roosevelt
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States was
fully able to use its powers of persuasion on those in
power (Somoza Dynasty). The United States was able to
accomplish what it felt it needed to do in the Latin
American community. With that said, plans for an overthrow
of Castro in Cuba were discussed and carried about by the
United States with the help of the Somoza government. It is
easy to see how the United States tipped the scales of war
on the Nicaraguan people. This idea is enhanced in a
statement made by the United States Ambassador to
Nicaragua, James Theberge,

25
There are very few unchanging principles governing the
relations between nations. Some however do exist, and
for the Americans the Monroe Doctrine is one of the
most enduring of them all. 42
In this statement it is easy to see the thought process of
the United States in terms of using its power in the Latin
American region.
Even when the United States enacted the "Good Neighbor
policy" 43 set up in the 1930s, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
the United States did still influenced Nicaragua. Its
influence was felt through both military force then by
funding. The Good Neighbor Policy stated that the United
States of America would not invest direct military action
towards Latin American countries but would, "now extract
voluntary cooperation from Latin American governments
through diplomatic and economic means." 44 This allowed the
United States to help with wars in Nicaragua by helping to
fund them rather then sending in troops.
As the Nicaraguan Revolution ended in 1979, it seemed
that the FSLN had succeeded. This successful revolution
ended the reign of a power hungry dictator. However, the
power of the United States in Nicaragua had as much to do
with the fall of the Somoza Dynasty as it had to do with
42
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the creation of the same dynasty. The United States started
its involvement in Nicaragua for the sole reason of
protecting United States based investments in the country.
It continued this attempt to control Nicaragua even as it
was forced out by Augusto Sandino and his troops, with the
placing of Anastasio Somoza Garcia as head of the National
Guard.
The twentieth century progressed and the policies that
made intervention possible changed from the Monroe Doctrine
to Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The United
States was forced to battle its growing threat of communism
by economic and political support in Latin America. As the
United States aid funneled into the pockets of the Somoza
Dynasty and the National Guard both groups became far too
greedy. This greed soon lead to the growing backlash from
both internal (FLSN and other political groups and
classes), and the external (with the Soviet Union and Cuba)
groups.
The United States, forced by the undeniable human
rights violations by Somoza and his National Guard, was
forced to distance itself from Somoza. Even with its action
of reducing funding from the failed Somoza Dynasty, the
United States still attempted to hold on in favor of those
whose ideology was against communism, the FSLN. As the
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Nicaraguan countryside was leveled and thousands of
Nicaraguan people were killed in the final moments of the
revolution the United States government was busily trying
to figure out how to overthrow the new FLSN government.
The United States government not only was responsible
for the Somozan Dynasty's hold in Nicaraguan for over
thirty years, it was also responsible for the loss of the
Nicaraguan government, by not funding Somoza when he had
put himself in a lose-lose situation. The policies of the
different eras in the United States-Nicaraguan relationship
forced the United States to use many different techniques
to gain control in the region. Due to the falling of Somoza
President Carter was willing to accept defeat at the hand
of the FSLN. However, his successor, President Ronald
Reagan admittedly opposed the now communist, FSLN, led
country.
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